Abstract
Introduction
To ensure interoperability of, say, a switch and its peripherals, vendors of the peripherals typically implement a communication protocol according to a specification given by the switch vendor. These implementations are tested by the switch vendor for conformance to the specification before they are deployed. A conformance test applies a sequence of inputs to an implementation and concludes that it is conformant if the observed outputs are as specified. As to be seen, we assume the switch vendor has access to a conformant implementation, whose probabilistic behavior can be measured and used in testing other implementations.
To design an revealing and efficient test sequence, the specification is usually modeled as a deterministic finitestate (Mealy) machine (FSM) F', e.g., [l, 2, 3,4]; see also [5, 61. An implernentation is a 'black box' whose behavior is modeled as another FSM M'. The implementation is said to be conformant if M' and F' are equivalent FSMs. Under suitable assumptions, a test input sequence t can be designed such that F' and M' are equivalent if and only if both produce the same output sequence on t. T h e design depends critically on the assumptions that both F' and M' are deterministic and that all transitions are observable.
In this paper, we explore conformance testing when the specification is modeled by a FSM F' that contains unobservable inputs, called T inputs, in addition to external inputs. An implementation is modeled as another FSM M' that shares the same set of inputs and outputs as F'. A tester can select external inputs to apply to the implementation, but it cannot directly control (force or forbid) nor observe 7 inputs. If the tester selects an external input when the implementation can either rnake that input transition or make other T transitions, the choice may be random; see $2. The nondeterminism introduced by the unobservable transitions makes the testing strategy based on deterministic FSM not directly applicable. We propose a probabilistic approach to conformance testing of such protocols. Unobservable transitions arise when the protocol's behavior depends on features not explicitly modeled, such as d a t a variables. For instance, an external input may represent receipt of a message by the protocol device. It triggers some computations involving internal variables as well as variables in the message. Depending on the result of the computations, the device enters a different state. If it is necessary to abstract out the details of the computation and the variables, result of the computation can be modeled by T transitions. Unobservable transitions also arise naturally when a protocol is specified and implemented as a collection of communicating FSMs (CFSMs). For instance, the specification F' may be obtained as the composite machine of individual CFSMs, in which T transitions are inter-CFSM communications. For conformance testing of CFSMs that does not compute the composite machine, see [7] . We make two critical assumptions. We assume that some states are observable in t,he iniplement8at,ion and that, when randomized external inputs are applied to the specification F', its observable probabilistic behavior (made precise in $2) is known. T h e first condition is common in digital-circuit designs for testability that is yet to find its way t o protocol design. The second assumption is justified if the conformance-test center has access t o a correct implementation, whose observable probabilistic behavior can then be measured and used in testing other implementations.
Under these assumptions, our method attempts t o detect faults in unobservable as well as observable transitions. Intuitively, we require that the implementation and the specification "look alike" (made precise by x-and P-conformant in $3) when both are subject to the same random environment, simulated by the tester. We assume that when randomized external inputs are applied to the specification F', the probabilistic behavior of F' is known. The basic idea is tha.t, when the same randomization is applied to the implementation M', its observable behavior depends not only on the induced probability law governing how the external inputs in I are chosen, but also on the structure of M'. Faulty unobservable transitions in Ad' may manifest themselves in certain statistics measurable from the 'black box'. Hence, we may check its conformance by comparing these measurements against the desirable statistics computed from the specification. In comparison, the previous strategy based on deterministic FSM uses mismatch i n outputs to detect faults. Here, we rely, in addition, on mismatch in the dynamics of the protocol under input randomization, such as the frequency an observable d a t e is visited or a transition is traversed.
In $2, we explain through an example our model, assumptions and approach. In §3, we formally define two notions of conformance ~ r-conformance and P-conformance -and propose probabilistic tests for them. Faultss in unobservable t,ransitions are detect,ed by comparing the statistics of the observed behavior against the desirable statistics. Our a.pproach hence depends critically on the assumption that we know the statistical behavior of F', against which the measured behavior of M' is compared. In 54, we investigate the sensitivity of the non-conforn~ance criterion for *-conformance to uncertainty in such knowledge and derive a non-conformance criterion that is robust against this uncertainty. A test for x-conformance is simpler than one for P-conformance, but is also less informative. In $5, we show how we may estimate a finer structure of the implementation using the measurements from a test for x-conformance. We conclude in $6 with remarks on the limitations of this work. All proofs are omitted and can be found in [8] .
Several previous papers on protocol testing or verification adopt a probabilistic approach [9, 10, 11, 71. Unlike these researchers, who use randomization primarily to circumvent the state-explosion problem, we use it to tackle the unobservability problem. As will become clear, our emphasis is on detecting faults in unobservable transitions by exploiting the protocol's dynamic behavior
Protocol model
A FSM is a 4-tauple A = ( S , I , 0 , 6 ) , where S is a finite set of states, I is a finite set of input labels, 0 is a finite set of oiitput labels, and 6 : S x I -+ 2sx0 is a transition funct,ion. 6 T ) ciin be more than a singleton. We require the specification to be completely specified on I in the following sense. F' can either accept all external inputs in I (and possibly unobservable inputs as well) or no external input in I , i.e. for all state s, either 6 p (s, a ) is defined for all a E I (and possibly for T as well), or it is defined only for T . We will assume for simplicity that F' produces no output on unobservable inputs, i.e. for all s for which S~( S , T )
shares the same set of transition labels as the specification F'. We similarly assume that M' is deterministic and completely specified on I , anti t,hat it produces no output on unobservable inputs. Finally, we assume both F' and M' are strongly connr:cted.
Following [TI, we assume that a stale is observable if. i n that sta.te, the implementation can accept external inputs from the tester. Under this as-
SF is the set of observable states in F'. There is a transition in F from state s to state s' 1) if F' can accept a n input a in s, produce an output b, and follow a sequence of T transitions to reach s', or 2) if 
We say that the implementation AY' has an eziernal fault if the observa6le implementation M contains a transition that has an incorrect output label or an incorrect destination state, or both. Note that this includes the case in which M has an T transition whose destination state is incorrect. Faulty unobservable transitions may sometimes manifest themselves as external faults that can be detected by simply noting the output and (observable) destination state of each transition in the observable implementation M . Other times, however, they manifest themselves only in the dynamic properties of the observable implementation. For our example, despite faults in T transitions, the observable implementation M is identical to the observable specification F (Figure 2 ). This kind of faults can be detected using our knowledge of probabilistic behavior of the protocol under input randomization, as explained next. ' We assume that the tester can generate external inputs, when the implementation is in an observable state, in such a way that all transitions in the specification F' are traversed with fixed and known probabilities. T h e transition probabilities for F ( t ) and M ( t ) in our example are shown in parentheses in Figure 2 . In practice, the transition probabilities of the specification F' under input randomization may be difficult to obtain. If the conformance-test, center has access to a correct implementation, it can measure its transition probabilities among observable states under the same randomization strategy and use these measurements as PF to test other implementations.
Probabilistic conformance testing
As in $2, a protocol specification is a FShl 
P r o p o s i t i o n 1 I'nder Assumptions A l -A d , the obseruable process F ( 1 ) ( M ( 1 ) ) admits a unique statzonary distributzon. 7rp > 0 ( X M > O).3 Moreover, F(2) (A[( t ) ) is asyiriptotacally stationary and ergodic.
Proposition 1 provides the basis for our probabilist.ic approach. It implies that we can measure ?TM or P,bf from the 'black box' and compare them against the desirable value T F or PF.
We can now formally define our notion of conformance. Roughly, it says that implementation M' conforms to specification F' if their observable behavior is probabilistically the same. Note that in the tests proposed below, every transition in M will be traversed, and therefore an external fault will be detected with probability one, 2; the test length increases. 
P-conformant (to F ' ) if the observable processes M ( t ) and F ( t ) have the same transition matrix, i.e., PM = PF (elementwise).
By Proposition 1, PM = PF * T M = T F . Hence, P-conformance is stronger than r-conformance: the set of implementations that are P-conformant is a subset of implementations that are r-conformant to a specification.
Test for n-conformance
T h e test procedure is:
1. Design test generatio'n so that Assumption A2 is satisfied. Compute T F using PF and (1) below.
Testing for P-conformance
The test procedure for P-conformance is similar to that in $3.1, except that the tester also counts the frequency each transition is traversed:
1. Design test generation so that Assumption A2 is satisfied. for all ( i l j ) E s', where P ( t ) and * ( t ) are "red during t'he test. In practice, we may choose testing P r a m e t e r s ( 1 > 0, € 2 > 0, and 6 > 0. We terminate the testing wlieii (5)
2.
and declare a fault if
In practice, we may choose two testing parameters c > 0 and 6 > 0. We terininate the test when for some ( i , j ) E 9. Il4t) -4 t -1111 < .
( 3 )
Seiisitivity
Our conformance test detects faults by comparing t.he measured stationary distribution T M against the desirable T F computed from PF according to ( l ) , and declare non-conformance if they differ, i.e. if 1 1~~ -TFII > 0. In this section, we investigate the effect of uncertainty in PF on detecting non-conformance.
Specifically, suppose that, due to modeling error (or measurement error if measurements of some other correct implementation is used as PF), the actual transition matrix of F ( t ) is PF(E) = PF + E for some error matrix E , instead of the nominal P F .
We seek a tolerance 6 > 0 such that guarantees the true non-conformance condition
where AF(E) is the stationary distribution of the actual matrix P F ( E ) . We will assume throughout that E is "small enough" so that Assumptions Al-A4 are in force.
By the Perron-Frobenius theorem [13] , we can write, possibly after rearranging the columns and rows, where v is an ( n -1)-dimensional row vector, U an (n -1) x ( n -1) nonsingular matrix, a a scalar, and b an ( n -1)-dimensional colutnn vector. Here, 71 is the number of observable states. Similarly, write
The next proposition provides a tolerance 6 for noticonformance that does not require solving for K F ( E ) .
We use the 11 norm llyll = Clyll for vectors, and the induced norm for matrices, i.e. IlAll = maxj xi IA(i,j)l for matrix A .
implies true non-conformance (8) 
Estimatiiig PM
Step 2 of the test procedure for r-conformance ($3.1) is less expensive than that for P-conformance (SY.2), because i t has to keep track of n2 fewer counts, 11 being the number of observable states. Moreover, t,he t>erminat,ion crit,erion (3) for the former is less stringent than tlte termination criterion (5-6) for the latter, possibly leading to a shorter test length. Hence t,he t,est for conformance is easier t o perform, though it is also less informat,ive since it measures only A M , not Phf. When a test for r-conformance shows that 114' is not r-conformant, we may wish to estimate, using the measured r~, the transition matrix PM to help identify faults in ,Ad'. Let m ( r n 4 ) be the set of all irreducible and aperiodic matrices whose unique statioiiary distribution is r~. We propose to find among the infinitely many transition matrices in m(nM) (see [S, Proposition 21) one which is "closest" to PF, subject to the condition that no external faults are observed. We hence seek the solution to the following problem:
where for a niatrix P , l l~l l = Jm is t,lie Frobeiiius iiorm [14] . Here, ' P < PF' denotes ' P~( i , j ) 
Example
Consider the problem (13) (14) , and suppose that for the problem (13) (14) with the given Pp and S M . Note that P' is not irreducible and hence is not i i i m(TA1). Thus the original problem (11-12) has no solution, though one can find a matrix P in m(xM) 0 that is arbitrarily close to P'.
Conclusion
We have proposed a probabilistic approach to conformance testing of protocols with unobservable transit.ions. linobservahle transitions arise naturally when 41;br a n y vector or matrix v , vT denotes its transpose.
a protocol is specified and implemented as a collection of CFSMs, or when its behavior depends on features not explicitly modeled. We have formally defined two notions of conformance and have suggested ways to test for them. We have derived a non-conformance criterion that is robust against uncertainty in our knowledge of the desirable probabilistic behavior. We have also presented a way to estimate the transition matrix of the observable implementation using the measured stationary distribution. The contribution of the paper is to exploit the different observable probabilistic behavior of an implementation to probe the unobservable transitions of a protocol.
Many issues are not addressed in this preliminary work. T h e previous test strategy based on deterministic model assumes observability of all transitions, but no states need be observable. Our model allows unobservable transitions and the induced nondeterminism, but only a t the expense of observability of some states ( A l ) and the probabilistic assumption on the test generation (A2). The practicality of these assumptions on real protocols needs further study. Our approach uses heavily the limit behavior of an implementation. The rate of convergence to its limit behavior determines the test length required t,o achieve a certain accuracy. The problem of choosing a good input randomization that is revealing and efficient has not been considered.
